Spreigl Evidence: Still Searching for a Principled Rule by Sampsell-Jones, Ted
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 4 Article 13
2009
Spreigl Evidence: Still Searching for a Principled
Rule
Ted Sampsell-Jones
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, ted.sampselljones@mitchellhamline.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation






SPREIGL EVIDENCE: STILL SEARCHING FOR A 
PRINCIPLED RULE 
Ted Sampsell-Jones†
 I. THE PAST: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPREIGL DOCTRINE 
IN MINNESOTA ..................................................................... 
 
1372 
A. Earliest Minnesota Cases – A Blunt, Categorical Rule....... 1374 
B. Development of Limitations and Exceptions ...................... 1377 
C. Early Twentieth-Century Endorsements of the Propensity 
Inference ......................................................................... 1379 
D. The Brief Influence of Julius Stone in Minnesota .............. 1381 
E. Spreigl and the Shift to Procedure ..................................... 1383 
F. The Impact of Rule 404 ................................................... 1385 
 II. THE PRESENT: CURRENT DOCTRINE AND THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF PROPENSITY EVIDENCE ............................ 1387 
A. Some Foundational Issues ................................................ 1388 
B. Unlinked Plans and the General Similarity Test ............... 1390 
1. Problems with the “Unlinked Plan” Doctrine .............. 1391 
2. Wermerskirchen, Wigmore, and Wright ....................... 1394 
C. From Unlinked Plans to Other “Exceptions” ..................... 1396 
1. Intent and Absence of Mistake or Accident .................. 1397 
2. Knowledge ................................................................. 1399 
3. Identity ..................................................................... 1400 
4. Summary .................................................................. 1402 
D. More Procedural Protections ............................................. 1402 
 III. THE FUTURE: A CANDID POLICY DEBATE ............................ 1404 
 
Crimes are typically defined in terms of discrete instances of 
conduct.  Criminal trials are therefore limited in scope.  Juries are 
charged not with determining whether a defendant is generally 
immoral or dangerous, but rather whether he committed a 
particular criminal act.  In short, we try a defendant “for what he 
did, not for who he is.”1
 
       †  Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. 
 The character evidence rule reflects that 
 1. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); accord United 
States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 
1
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focus.  The rule, developed at common law and codified into Rule 
404, states that evidence of a defendant’s acts of uncharged 
misconduct is inadmissible to show his bad character.2
But the character evidence rule does not categorically ban 
evidence of other misconduct.  Rule 404(b) allows evidence of 
uncharged misconduct to be admitted for “other purposes”—i.e., 
non-character purposes—such as motive, intent, plan, and 
identity.
 
3  In Minnesota, evidence offered for such a purpose is 
known as Spreigl evidence after the eponymous 1965 Minnesota 
Supreme Court decision.4
Applying Rule 404(b) is often difficult because the line 
between permissible non-character uses and impermissible 
character uses of other misconduct evidence is often subtle.  
Evidence law commentators have often criticized courts for failing 
to draw the line with enough care.
  (In most jurisdictions, it is known simply 
as 404(b) evidence.) 
5  Wigmore himself thought it 
“hopeless to attempt to reconcile the precedents under various 
heads.”6  Others have been more ambitious.  Just this year, as part 
of the New Wigmore treatise, David Leonard published an entire 
volume devoted solely to the 404(b) problem of drawing the line 
between permissible and impermissible uses of uncharged 
misconduct evidence.7  Edward Imwinkelried previously published 
a two-volume treatise devoted mostly to the same question.8
 
1067, 1073 n.10 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 575 (6th 
Cir. 1989); State v. Prioleau, 664 A.2d 743, 771 (Conn. 1995); State v. Sullivan, 679 
N.W.2d 19, 23 (Iowa 2004); State v. Yager, 461 N.W.2d 741, 752 (Neb. 1990). 
 2. FED. R. EVID. 404. 
 3. Id. at 404(b). 
 4. State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). 
 5. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE      
§ 4:28 (3d ed. 2008) (“Perhaps because the issue so inundates courts hearing 
criminal appeals, published opinions often give it but passing mention, and it is 
lamentably common to see recitations of laundry lists of permissive uses, with little 
analysis or attention to the particulars.”); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.20[3]  (2nd ed. 1997) (“[C]ourts on 
occasion have admitted other-acts evidence almost automatically, without any real 
analysis, if they find it fits within one of the categories specified in Rule 404(b).”); 
22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE – EVIDENCE § 5239 (“Yet despite the recurrence of the issues, the 
[appellate] opinions are often poorly reasoned and provide little guidance to trial 
judges.”) (footnote omitted). 
 6. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 302, at 246 (Chadborne rev. ed. 1979). 
 7. DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENCE OF OTHER MISCONDUCT 
AND SIMILAR EVENTS (2009) [hereinafter NEW WIGMORE]. 
 8. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (2006). 
  The 
2
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mass of those accomplished works demonstrates both the 
importance and the difficulty of the legal problem. 
Without question, there is room for disagreement about 
particular applications of Rule 404(b).  In cases around the hazy 
line between permissible and impermissible uses, reasonable jurists 
can disagree.  But the case law in Minnesota and elsewhere suggests 
a disagreement not just about particular applications but also about 
the underlying principle itself—about what counts as a permissible 
use, about the propriety of the propensity inference itself. 
The traditional view of Rule 404(b) is that it bars propensity 
reasoning but allows the use of uncharged misconduct for non-
propensity purposes.  Thus, when evidence of uncharged 
misconduct is offered for one of the other 404(b) purposes, its 
relevance must not depend on propensity.  In other words, when a 
prosecutor offers evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, it is not 
enough for her to show that the evidence demonstrates his motive, 
intent, identity, or plan—rather, she must show that the evidence 
demonstrates his motive, intent, identity or plan through some 
chain of inferences that does not include the propensity inference.  
 That traditional view is uniformly endorsed by evidence law 
treatises.9  It is also widely recognized by the casebooks used in law 
school evidence classes.10
The case law, however, is far less clear.  Many courts recognize 
(and at least attempt to apply) the traditional view.
   
11
 
 9. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 2.19 (“[T]he act must have independent, 
legitimate, or special relevance on another [non-propensity] theory.”) (footnotes 
omitted); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, § 4:28 (“[S]uch proof offered is 
not saved from the principle of exclusion by the mere fact that it supports a 
specific inference to a point like intent if the necessary logical steps include an 
inference of general character or propensity, or if it seems likely that the proof will 
be used to support such an inference.”); 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 404.02[9] (8th ed. 2002); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra 
note 5, § 5239 (“[T]he rule admits evidence of other crimes whenever it is 
relevant without using the inference of character anywhere in the chain of 
inference.”).  But see Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious 
Ban on Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181 (1998) 
(arguing that the purported propensity ban cannot be squared with the case law). 
 10. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 147–50 (2d ed. 2008); ERIC D. GREEN ET 
AL., PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 181–82 (3d ed. 2000); RICHARD 
O. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 331 (3d ed. 2000); DAVID P. 
LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 355 (2d ed. 2007). 
  Others courts 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(“[T]he evidence must have special relevance to an issue in the case such as intent 
or knowledge, and must not include bad character or propensity as a necessary 
link in the inferential chain.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States 
3
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reject the traditional view of Rule 404(b), at least implicitly.  They 
routinely admit evidence whose relevance depends primarily on 
propensity so long as it ultimately goes to prove one of the listed 
“other purposes” in 404(b).  Minnesota courts fall in the latter 
camp.  In general, they do not closely scrutinize the precise chain 
of inferences that supports the relevance of Spreigl evidence, and 
under various broad doctrines of admissibility, they regularly admit 
evidence whose sole or primary relevance depends on propensity.12
 
v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen evidence of prior bad 
acts is offered, the proponent must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a 
chain of logical inferences, no link of which may be the inference that the 
defendant has the propensity to commit the crime charged.”); Bradbury v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1365 (10th Cir. 1987) (“The proper approach is 
not simply to find a ‘pigeon hole’ in which the proof might fit, but to determine 
whether the evidence proves something other than propensity . . . .”); People v. 
Crawford, 582 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Mich. 1998) (“[A] common pitfall in MRE 
404(b) cases is the trial courts’ tendency to admit the prior misconduct evidence 
merely because it has been ‘offered’ for one of the rule’s enumerated proper 
purposes.”); State v. McManus, 594 N.W.2d 623, 629 (Neb. 1999) (“Evidence that 
is offered for a proper purpose is often referred to as having ‘special’ or 
‘independent relevance,’ which means its relevance does not depend on its 
tendency to show propensity.”). 
 12. See infra Part II.  
 
To be sure, Minnesota courts are not in any legal sense 
obligated to follow the traditional view.  As a textual matter, Rule 
404(b) itself does not unambiguously endorse the traditional view.  
As a historical matter, the traditional view was never uniformly 
endorsed by the case law prior to the rule’s enactment, and the 
drafters of the rule made no effort to settle the well-known 
contradictions of their contemporaneous case law.  As a doctrinal 
matter, Minnesota’s rejection of the traditional view finds ample 
support both in its own case law and in the case law of the many 
other courts around the country.  The only authority with which 
the Spreigl doctrine squarely conflicts is the authority of evidence 
law treatises, which are ultimately only worth the weight they are 
given by courts—in this case, not much. 
Still, even if it is in some sense justified by other legal 
authority, the Spreigl doctrine fails as a matter of logic.  If the 
traditional view of Rule 404(b) is rejected, then the character 
evidence rule itself is meaningless.  If propensity reasoning is 
allowed to prove the other 404(b) purposes, then the character 
evidence rule amounts to almost nothing, and it should simply be 
abandoned.   
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/13
  
1372 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:4 
As a policy matter, a good case can be made for outright 
repeal.  In any event, there is no point in maintaining a 
meaningless rule (or a rule that courts refuse to enforce).  
Conversely, if the rule is worth having, then it is also worth 
enforcing in a meaningful way, and the only meaningful way to 
enforce the rule is to embrace and attempt to apply the traditional 
view barring the propensity inference.  Either outcome could be 
justified as a matter of logic and as a matter of policy.  What cannot 
be justified as a matter of logic or policy is the current Spreigl 
doctrine, which only pretends to enforce some sort of ill-defined 
prohibition on character evidence.   
This article first examines how Minnesota’s character evidence 
doctrine developed, with a particular focus on the historical 
confusion regarding the propriety of the propensity inference.13  It 
then examines current case law and argues that Minnesota’s 
current Spreigl doctrine routinely allows propensity evidence.14  It 
finally proposes a choice between abandoning the current Spreigl 
doctrine and repealing the character rule itself.15
I. THE PAST: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPREIGL DOCTRINE IN 
MINNESOTA 
  I take no position 
on which alternative should be chosen, but either is better than the 
status quo.  The current doctrine in Minnesota is a Potemkin 
village. 
It is often said that the character evidence rule is in decline.16
 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character 
Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, The 
Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 423 (2006) (“Paradoxically, in the past 
decade, the tables have turned. The character evidence prohibition is no longer 
considered sacrosanct.”). 
  
That is true so far as it goes, but it leaves the false impression of 
some past golden age when the character evidence rule was well 
understood and rigorously enforced by courts.  In fact, the history 
of the rule in Minnesota and elsewhere is a history of substantial 
confusion.  The rationale for the rule has shifted over time, and the 
rule itself has been enforced inconsistently throughout its history.  
That legacy of confusion helps to explain the current Spreigl 
doctrine and its unprincipled approach to propensity evidence.   
5
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The confusion about the rule’s scope is in part a function of 
confusion about the rule’s rationale.  The modern rationale of the 
character evidence rule is that evidence of a defendant’s prior 
crimes will lead the jury to convict on improper grounds.  In 
Wigmore’s famous articulation of the rationale: 
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal—
whether judge or jury—is to give excessive weight to the 
vicious record of the crime thus exhibited, and either to 
allow it to bear to strongly on the present charge, or to 
take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation 
irrespective of guilt of the present charge.17
Such improper grounds certainly include the one that 
[the defendant] points to here: generalizing a 
defendant’s earlier bad act into bad character and taking 
that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now 
charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction 
even if he should happen to be innocent momentarily). 
As then-Judge Breyer put it, “Although . . . ‘propensity 
evidence’ is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for 
crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of 
guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves 
punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs 
ordinary relevance.”
 
The United States Supreme Court echoed those concerns 
more recently in Old Chief:  
18
As both Wigmore and Old Chief suggest, there are in fact two 
distinct rationales—two distinct types of unfair prejudice that 
character evidence might produce.  The first risk has to do with the 
propensity inference itself.  The inference from propensity is that 
because a defendant committed crimes in the past, it is more likely 
that he committed the charged crime as well.  In other words, 




The second risk has nothing to do with the propensity 
inference.  Rather, the second rationale relates to nullification and 
  The propensity inference meets the standards of 
relevance, but there is a risk that jurors will give it more weight 
than it deserves. 
 
 17. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW   § 194, at 233 (1904). 
 18. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–81 (1997) (quoting United 
States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir 1982)). 
 19. United States v. McCourt, 925 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1991). 
6
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preventative conviction.  The concern is that if jurors know of a 
defendant’s prior crimes, they will return a verdict of guilty even if 
they do not conclude that the defendant committed the presently 
charged offense.  If the jurors reason that way, they do not rely on 
the propensity inference from past crimes to current crimes—
rather, they convict on past crimes alone. 
As in Old Chief, courts often treat the two rationales as 
overlapping and even indistinct.  But the two rationales are 
different, and importantly so.  Ultimately, the scope of the 
character evidence rule is mostly a function of the first rationale.  
The scope of the character evidence rule depends on the extent to 
which the propensity inference is allowed.   
On that point, as I will discuss below, the current law in 
Minnesota (as in many jurisdictions) is muddled.  The current 
confusion, however, is nothing new or recent.  The common law 
character evidence rule that prevailed prior to the enactment of 
the Rules of Evidence was muddled.  At times, Minnesota courts 
barred evidence of uncharged misconduct regardless of whether 
the propensity inference was involved, and at other times, 
Minnesota courts explicitly endorsed propensity reasoning.  Those 
dueling strands of reasoning were never conclusively resolved by 
the case law, nor were they resolved by the enactment of Rule 404 
itself.  It is that history of confusion that explains the current 
problems with the doctrine.  
A. Earliest Minnesota Cases – A Blunt, Categorical Rule 
The character evidence rule began to develop in England 
during the late seventeenth century.20  The rule was originally 
justified not by the modern rationales of unfair prejudice but 
rather by concerns regarding relevance and surprise.21  At least into 
the early eighteenth century, the rule was enforced only 
sporadically and subject to substantial exceptions.22
By the mid-nineteenth century, when Minnesota became a 
state and its court system began operation, the rule had solidified 
  Thus, at the 
time when American jurisdictions imported the character evidence 
rule, it was relatively recent and somewhat uncertain in scope. 
 
 20. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 190–95 
(2003); Thomas J. Reed, Trial By Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence 
in Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 716–18 (1981). 
 21. LANGBEIN, supra note 20, at 191. 
 22. Id. at 202–03. 
7
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somewhat in American law.  Nineteenth- century Minnesota cases 
appeared to state the rule in a fairly strong form, but also in an 
inchoate form, with an indefinite scope and rationale.   
The earliest published Minnesota case dealing with the rule 
was probably Hoberg v. State,23 decided in 1859, one year after 
Minnesota was admitted to the union.  Hoberg was charged with 
theft, which was proven in part by evidence that the stolen goods 
were found in his house.24  In the course of its case, the prosecution 
also presented evidence that some dresses were also discovered 
there.25  Hoberg’s daughter testified that the dresses were not 
stolen, and perhaps in rebuttal, the prosecution called a witness to 
testify that the dresses had been stolen from his clothes line.26  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the admission of the rebuttal 
testimony was error that entitled Hoberg to a new trial.27
These last statements, as before observed, were far beyond 
what the prosecution proposed to prove by the witness, 
and were well calculated to prejudice the prisoner in the 
minds of the jury. The State should not have been 
permitted, on the pretense of discrediting the witness, by 
impeaching her on a matter immaterial to the issue, to 
prove a distinct felony not charged in the indictment. We 
can scarcely conceive of any testimony more likely to have 
had an injurious effect upon the minds of the jury.
  The court 
held:  
28
The Hoberg ruling said nothing further about the scope of the 
rule or its rationale.  It stood for the general proposition that 
evidence of uncharged crimes was prejudicial and “injurious,” but 
it did not specify why.
 
29
A decade later, the court once again applied the rule in a 
surprisingly strong form in State v. Hoyt.
 
30  Hoyt was charged with 
killing Stamford, and Stamford’s wife testified that on the day of 
and the day after the alleged murder, Hoyt had also assaulted her.31
 
 23. 3 Minn. 181 (1859). 
 24. Id. at 182. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 183. 
 27. Id. at 185. 
 28. Id. at 184. 
 29. Id.  
 30. 13 Minn. 125 (1868). 
 31.  Id. at 127. 
  
The court ruled that it was error to admit evidence of the other 
8
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assault because it “had no tendency to establish the charge 
contained in the indictment, and its natural effect was to prejudice 
the jury against the defendant.”32
To modern eyes, that conclusion looks far too strong.  The 
court suggested that the evidence was irrelevant to the charged 
offense, but certainly evidence that Hoyt assaulted Stamford’s wife 
at least made it somewhat more likely that he also killed Stamford.  
Indeed, the evidence was likely relevant for both non-propensity 
and propensity reasons.
   
33
In 1898 in State v. Austin,
  But the court deemed it both irrelevant 
and prejudicial.  Again, as in Hoberg, the court did not discuss the 
nature of the prejudice. 
34 a saloon owner was accused of 
selling liquor to minors.  He testified in his own defense that he 
had never sold liquor to minors.35  In rebuttal, the prosecution 
called witnesses who had seen him selling liquor to minors.36  The 
English common law character evidence rule, like the modern 
rules, allowed the prosecution to present character evidence in 
rebuttal.37  The evidence in Austin might still have been 
objectionable because it was in the form of specific instances rather 
than reputation evidence.38
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Under modern doctrine, the evidence would likely be admitted on a non-
propensity theory both as “inextricably intertwined” evidence and also as evidence 
of a linked plan. 
 34. 74 Minn. 463, 77 N.W. 301 (1898). 
 35. Id. at 464, 77 N.W. at 302.  
 36. Id.  
 37. LANGBEIN, supra note 20, at 196–98; See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (stating 
that “evidence of a pertinent trait of character” of a defendant is admissible if 
“offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same”); MINN. R. EVID. 
404(a)(1) (same). 
 38. See FED. R. EVID. 405(a); MINN. R. EVID. 405(a). 
  But the Austin court’s ruling had 
nothing to do with form.  Rather, it suggested that rebuttal 
character evidence was not allowed in any form.  It held:  
It was error for the court to receive the evidence. If it was 
introduced for the purpose of impeaching the defendant, 
who had denied making such sales, it was clearly 
inadmissible, for the state had no right, for the purpose of 
discrediting defendant, to ask questions which were 
immaterial to the issue, and which would tend to prove 
against defendant an offense distinct from that charged in 
the indictment.  
. . . 
9
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It is a general rule that evidence of a distinct and 
independent offense cannot be admitted on the trial of a 
defendant charged with a criminal offense. To admit 
evidence of another criminal act would be to oppress a 
defendant by trying him for an offense of which he has 
had no notice, and for which he is unprepared, and, 
frequently, to prejudice him in the eyes of the jury. There 
are well-known exceptions to this rule, but the evidence 
now under consideration does not bring the case within 
any of the exceptions.39
As for rationales for the rule, the Austin court mentioned 
three.  First, mimicking Hoberg and Hoyt, the court suggested that 
uncharged offenses were “immaterial” to the charged offense.
 
Once again, to modern eyes, the conclusion in Austin looks too 
strong because it appears to endorse a categorical ban on rebuttal 
evidence rather than a narrower ban based on the form of the 
rebuttal evidence.   
40  
Second, the court mentioned surprise and lack of notice.41  And 
third, the court mentioned prejudice.42
B. Development of Limitations and Exceptions 
  As in Hoberg and Hoyt, the 
court did not elaborate on the nature of the prejudice.   
In short, the earliest Minnesota cases applied a robust but 
naïve form of the character evidence rule.  The character evidence 
rule initially appeared to be categorical, and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court did not initially recognize exceptions that had 
already been recognized in other jurisdictions.  As for the rule’s 
rationale, the court only spoke generally of prejudice.  It never 
explained what sort of prejudice evidence of other crimes would 
produce.  In particular, it never explained whether its view of 
prejudice included the propensity inference itself, or the risk or 
preventative detention, or both. 
The early Minnesota cases of Hoberg, Hoyt, and Austin 
suggested that evidence of uncharged misconduct was categorically 
inadmissible, no matter the context or purpose.  Those rulings 
were out of step with the standard interpretations of the character 
evidence rule that prevailed elsewhere.  But before long, the 
 
 39. Austin, 74 Minn. at 464, 77 N.W. at 302 (citation omitted).  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
10
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Minnesota Supreme Court began to develop a far more moderate 
rule.  It did so by recognizing several limitations and exceptions. 
First, the court recognized that evidence of uncharged acts 
could be admitted if they were part of the same transaction or 
series of events as the charged crime.  In other words, the court 
began to develop the “res gestae” doctrine.43  Its first limitation of 
this sort came in State v. Madigan in 1894.44  A lawyer was charged 
with perjury for filing a fraudulent lawsuit that the plaintiff had not 
authorized.45  The prosecution presented evidence that the 
defendant, prior to filing the suit, had forged a document claiming 
to show the plaintiff’s authorization.46  The court held that the 
evidence was properly received because “[i]t certainly was material 
on the question of whether or not defendant was the attorney of 
[the plaintiff].”47
Following Madigan, in a series of other cases around the turn 
of the century, the court similarly held that where uncharged and 
charged acts were “all one transaction,” evidence of the former 
could be admitted to prove evidence of the latter.
 
48
Second, the court began to suggest that the character evidence 
rule did not apply, or did not apply as strongly, to prosecutions of 
certain crimes such as fraud and forgery.
  These cases 
accepted a broader notion of relevance and materiality than the 
court had initially endorsed.  In so doing, they effectively (though 
never explicitly) overruled Hoyt. 
49  These case-based 
exceptions had been recognized elsewhere in both the English and 
early American applications of the character evidence rule.50
Third, and most importantly, the court began to recognize 
exceptions based on the purpose for which the uncharged acts 
were offered.  The exceptions were first described in detail in 1902 
  
 
 43.  “Latin ‘thing done.’ The events at issue, or other events 
contemporaneous with them. In evidence law, words and statements about the res 
gestae are usually admissible under a hearsay exception . . . .” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1335 (8th ed. 2004).  
 44. 57 Minn. 425, 59 N.W. 490 (1894). 
 45. Id. at 428–31, 59 N.W. at 491–92. 
 46. Id. at 431, 59 N.W. at 492.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 72 Minn. 522, 526, 75 N.W. 715, 717 (1898); State 
v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 N.W. 63 (1895). 
 49. State v. Bourne, 86 Minn. 426, 90 N.W. 1105 (1902); Wilson, 72 Minn. at 
527, 75 N.W. at 717. 
 50. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2.41, at 36–64. 
11
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in State v. Fitchette.51
[S]everal well-defined exceptions to the general rule as 
stated above have been recognized in the decided cases,–
as where facts tend to show a distinct hostility, jealousy, or 
erotic passion indicated by a previous criminal act; or 
where the transaction depends upon the specific intent 
with which it is committed, when the claim can be made 
that the investigated act was the result of a mistake; or 
where the identity of the accused or of the instrumentality 
to perpetrate the crime is so connected or involved in 
some other act of guilt that one relates to the other; or, 
again, where the previous offense is a part of a scheme or 
conspiracy incidental to or involved in the one on trial.
  After discussing the general rule excluding 
evidence of uncharged misconduct, the court noted: 
52
The Fitchette court cautioned against overuse of the exceptions 




C. Early Twentieth-Century Endorsements of the Propensity Inference 
During the early twentieth century, as the character evidence 
rule in Minnesota developed into something resembling its 
modern form, it remained remarkably under-theorized.  In 
explaining the rule, Fitchette relied on several late nineteenth 
century evidence treatises.  Quoting Wharton’s treatise, the court 
described the rationale of the character rule: 
  But before long, the court began applying the 
exceptions broadly. 
[t]o admit evidence of such collateral facts would be to 
oppress the party implicated by trying him on a case for 
preparing which he has had no notice, and sometimes by 
prejudicing the jury against him by publishing offenses of 
which, even if guilty, he may have long since repented, or 
which may have long since been condoned. Trials would, 
by this process, be injuriously prolonged, the real issue 
obscured, verdicts taken on side issues.54
The endorsed rationale was thus still based largely on notions 
of materiality, collaterality, and unfair surprise.  The court’s stated 
understanding of the prejudice was that it was unfair to inform the 
 
 
 51. 88 Minn. 145, 92 N.W. 527 (1902). 
 52. Id. at 148, 92 N.W. at 528. 
 53. See id. at 148–49, 92 N.W. at 528.  
 54. Id. at 148, 92 N.W. at 528 (quoting WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 29 
(9th ed. 1884)). 
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jury of past acts for which a defendant may have repented.55
More strikingly still, in several turn of the century cases, the 
court made statements that appeared to endorse the propensity 
inference.  In Madigan,
  The 
modern concerns of preventative detention and overweighting 
propensity had yet to appear. 
56 the court stated broadly that “[i]f the 
evidence offered tends to prove the commission of the crime 
charged, it is not incompetent because it also tends to prove the 
commission of another crime.”57  In 1903 in State v. Ames,58
The question as to the admissibility of evidence of this 
character has been before the courts often, and the rule 
permitting its introduction is variously stated by judges; 
but, reduced to its narrowest compass, the true rule is that 
evidence of the commission of other crimes is admissible 
when it tends corroboratively or directly to establish the 
defendant’s guilt of the crime charged in the indictment 
on trial, or some essential ingredient of such offense. As 
stated by Chief Justice Parker in People v. Molineux: “Does 
the evidence of the other crime fairly aid in establishing 
the commission by defendant of the crime for which he is 
being tried? And that test, and none other, is fairly 
established by the authorities.”
 the 
court stated the matter in even stronger terms: 
59
Ames was arguably ambiguous on the propriety of propensity 
reasoning, but the court’s endorsement soon became more 
explicit.  In State v. Whipple
 
Of course, the propensity inference itself is one means by 
which evidence of other acts might “corroboratively establish” guilt 
for the charged crime.  Evidence of other crimes can aid in 
establishing guilt—and one way that it can so aid is by 
demonstrating the defendant’s propensity.   
60 in 1919, the court upheld the 
admission of prior drug sales against a defendant charged with a 
drug crime.61
It was competent for the state to introduce evidence of 
other sales of morphine to Chandler and of the sale of 
 
 
 55. See id.  
 56. 57 Minn. 425, 59 N.W. 490 (1894). 
 57. Id. at 432, 59 N.W. at 492. 
 58. 90 Minn. 183, 96 N.W. 330 (1903). 
 59. Id. at 191–92, 96 N.W. at 333 (citation omitted). 
 60. 143 Minn. 403, 173 N.W. 801 (1919). 
 61. See id. at 407, 173 N.W. at 802. 
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morphine to other drug addicts, in violation of the 
statute. Evidence of this character is admissible if it is part 
of one plan or scheme carried on by defendant to willfully 
violate the law, or if it tends to show an inclination or 
predisposition to commit the offense charged. The evidence of 
other offenses received in this case was within the rule.62
The court thus held that evidence of uncharged misconduct was 
admissible to show “inclination or predisposition”—which is to say 
that it was admissible to show propensity.
 
63
D. The Brief Influence of Julius Stone in Minnesota 
  In a series of other 
cases over the next two decades, the court cited Ames and Whipple in 
decisions allowing prior crimes as “confirmatory” or 
“corroborating” evidence. 
Ames’s endorsement of propensity reasoning was ambiguous, 
and Whipple’s more explicit endorsement was not repeated by the 
court. It certainly cannot be said that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court consistently endorsed the propensity reasoning in the early 
twentieth century. But at a minimum, those cases show that into the 
mid-twentieth century, the Minnesota Supreme Court lacked a 
clear understanding of the role that the propensity inference 
played in the operation of the character evidence rule.  As we will 
see, that confusion has yet to be resolved. 
In the 1930s, Professor Julius Stone wrote two enormously 
influential articles in the Harvard Law Review on the character 
evidence rule and the admissibility of other acts evidence.  Stone 
traced the historical development of the rule, first in England,64 
and then in the United States.65  Stone contended that there was an 
“original” form of the character evidence rule, and that there was 
also a “spurious” form that had developed in the early and mid-
nineteenth century.66
Under the “original rule,” according to Stone, “only evidence 
relevant merely to propensity was excluded.  Hence admissibility 
depended upon the answer to one simple question.  Is this 
   
 
 62. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 
HARV. L. REV. 954 (1933). 
 65. Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. 
L. REV. 988 (1938). 
 66. Id. at 989–1004. 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/13
  
1382 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:4 
evidence in any way relevant to a fact in issue otherwise than by 
merely showing propensity?”67  Under the apocryphal and 
“spurious” form, by contrast, “the rule is stated as a broad rule 
excluding evidence of all other bad acts, unless the evidence falls 
within some one of a list of exceptions.”68
What is the result? In the place of the inquiry—is this 
evidence relevant otherwise than merely through 
propensity? there is immediately substituted the inquiry—
does this evidence fall within any exception to the rule of 
exclusion?
  The different rules led 
to different inquiries by courts: 
69




The spurious rule was both overinclusive and underinclusive.  
On one hand, the spurious approach led courts to exclude other 
acts evidence that was relevant for non-propensity purposes simply 
because they could not fit it within one of the listed exceptions.
 
71  
On the other hand, the spurious approach led courts to admit 
propensity evidence simply because it went to one of the excepted 
categories:72
[B]ecause attention is concentrated on interpreting the 
list of exceptions, not only is the requirement of relevance 
forgotten, but the very object of the original rule—to 
prevent proof of guilt by proof of propensity to commit—
is quite forgotten, and eventually an exception is admitted 
to the broad rule which admits evidence precisely for the 
reason that the original rule excluded it. The broad rule, 
which seemed to give greater protection to the accused, 




Put differently, the spurious approach said that other acts were 
generally inadmissible unless they were offered to show intent, for 
example.  But under this approach, courts allowed the admission of 
other acts evidence to show intent by way of a propensity inference.  
If courts allow the propensity inference for the purposes of showing 
 
 
 67. Id. at 1004. 
 68. Id. at 1005. 
 69. Id.  
 70. See id. at 1005–08. 
 71. See id. at 1005–06. 
 72. See id. at 1033. 
 73. Id. at 1033. 
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motive, intent, identity, and the like, then there is little or nothing 
left of the character evidence rule.  That fundamental problem, 
identified by Stone in the 1930s, still plagues the rule in Minnesota 
today. 
For a brief moment, it appeared that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court might follow Professor Stone’s recommendation to abandon 
the “spurious rule.”  In 1952 in St Paul v. Greene,74 the court 
discussed Stone’s article at length.75  It discussed its previous 
exceptions-based approach, and noted the criticism from Stone 
and others.76  The court seemed to admit that in some previous 
cases, it had under the exceptions admitted evidence that was 
indistinguishable from propensity.77  And while it did not ultimately 
reject its prior cases, it at least hinted that it might.78
But the seeds of reform in Greene never took root.  Three years 
later, in State v. DePauw,
 
79 the court re-established its exceptions-
based approach.80  It there upheld the admission of prior unlinked 
acts of molestation against an accused molester.81
E. Spreigl and the Shift to Procedure 
  In so doing, it 
once again admitted evidence indistinguishable from propensity 
simply because it arguably fit into one of the excepted categories. 
In 1965 the court decided Spreigl, the case for which evidence 
of uncharged misconduct in Minnesota is now named.82
The reasons thus marshalled in various forms are 
reducible to three: (1) The over-strong tendency to 
believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because 
he is a likely person to do such acts; (2) The tendency to 
condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the present 
charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from 
  In Spreigl, 
the court for the first time recognized the modern rationales for 
the character evidence rule, taken from Wigmore’s third edition: 
 
 74. 238 Minn. 202, 56 N.W.2d 423 (1952). 
 75. See id. at 205–06, 56 N.W.2d at 425–26. 
 76. See id. at 203–06, 56 N.W.2d at 424–26. 
 77. Id. at 206 & n.4, 56 N.W.2d at 426 & n.4. 
 78. See id. at 206 n.5 (noting Professor Stone’s criticism that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court had previously admitted evidence “somewhat indistinguishable 
from propensity”).  
 79. 246 Minn. 91, 74 N.W.2d 297 (1955). 
 80. Id. at 93–94, 74 N.W.2d at 299. 
 81. Id. at 95–96, 74 N.W.2d at 300. 
 82. 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). 
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other offences; * * * (3) The injustice of attacking one 
necessarily unprepared to demonstrate that the attacking 
evidence is fabricated * * *.83
As it had in Greene, the court appeared to recognize that some of its 
prior rulings (including DePauw) had allowed evidence 
indistinguishable from propensity.
 
84  “In permitting evidence of 
prior offenses to be received as a part of a common plan or 
scheme, we have come perilously close to putting the defendant’s 
character and record in issue . . . .”85
“Perilously close” was an understatement, and yet the Spreigl 
court refused to correct or limit those prior cases.  The court did 
not address the fundamental problem—the problem identified by 
Professor Stone—regarding the role of the propensity inference in 
cases where other acts evidence was offered for one of the other 
purposes.  In fact, the Spreigl court once again allowed the very 
same type of evidence.  As a substantive matter, it allowed the 
admission of an accused molester’s other acts of molestation simply 
because the “similarity of behavior is sufficient to justify receiving 
the challenged evidence.”
   
86
[W]e now hold that in the trial of this and future criminal 
cases where the state seeks to prove that an accused has 
been guilty of additional crimes and misconduct on other 
occasions, although such evidence is otherwise admissible 
under some exception to the general exclusionary rule, it 
shall not hereafter be received unless within a reasonable 
time before trial the state furnishes defendant in writing a 
statement of the offenses it intends to show he has 
committed, described with the particularity required of an 
indictment or information . . . .
 
What the court did instead was add a layer of procedural 
protection.  It added a notice requirement: 
87
Of the three rationales for the character evidence rule cited by 
Wigmore and noted by the court, the Spreigl notice rule addressed 
only the third rationale.  As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted 
when it subsequently rejected the Spreigl notice rule, “[w]hile this 
rule may eliminate the surprise on the part of an accused, it does 
 
 
 83. Id. at 496, 139 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting JOHN H. WIGMORE, 1 WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE § 194 (Little, Brown, & Co. (1904)). 
 84. Id. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 171. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 170. 
 87. Id. at 496–97, 139 N.W.2d at 173. 
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little to eliminate any confusion of issues, misleading of the jury, or 
undue prejudice.”88
F.  The Impact of Rule 404 
  To put a finer point on it, the Spreigl decision 
allowed the prosecution to convict by propensity so long as it 
notified the defendant in advance that it planned to do so. 
The Federal Rules took effect in 1973, and the parallel 
Minnesota Rules followed in 1977.  Under both, Rule 404 was 
intended to codify the common law character evidence rule.  
Unfortunately, the common law rule was just as confused around 
the country as it was in Minnesota, and the drafters of Rule 404 did 
little to alleviate the confusion.89
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.
 
Rule 404(b), the critical provision, stated: 
90
To a large degree, the Rule reflected the “spurious” approach to 
character evidence that Professor Stone had derided four decades 
earlier.  Some have suggested that the Rule was intended to 
incorporate elements of both the original approach and the 
spurious approach.
 
91  But in any event, the Rule listed the typical 
common law “exceptions” to the character evidence rule.  
Moreover, the Rule did nothing to settle the question of whether, 
or to what extent, propensity reasoning was allowed to prove one of 
the excepted other purposes.92
The Federal Advisory Committee said very little about Rule 
404(b), which was surprising given the Rule’s importance, and 
 
 
 88. Whitty v. State, 149 N.W.2d 557, 565 (Wis. 1967). 
 89. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 173 (“The drafters of the Federal Rules 
had the opportunity to propose a complete overhaul; they chose not to.”); WRIGHT 
& GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5239 (“Lamentably, the Advisory Committee chose to 
leave the law in its messy state; Rule 404(b) does nothing to clarify the issues, and 
may in some respects have muddied the waters even more.”). 
 90. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 91. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 4.3.2.  
 92. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5239 (“Rule 404(b) is a good 
illustration of Wigmore’s Rule of Codification: the ‘always conceded principle 
should frequently be found solemnly enacted, while the important controversies . . 
. are ignored and left without solution.’”) (quoting 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 523 
n.1 (3d ed. 1940)). 
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given how much controversy had arisen over the common law 
rule.93  The Advisory Committee notes repeated that evidence of 
other crimes was inadmissible to show character, but was admissible 
for other purposes.94
No mechanical solution is offered. The determination 
must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of 
the availability of other means of proof and other factors 
appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 
403.
  It went on: 
95
The Advisory Committee cited no representative case that 
demonstrated a proper approach.  It cited only a single piece of 
authority: a 1956 Iowa Law Review article, Other Vices, Other Crimes, by 
Professors Slough and Knightly.
 
96
The citation to Slough and Knightly’s article was surprising in 
its own right since that article provided a stinging critique of 
courts’ erosion of the character evidence rule.  The authors argued 
courts had fundamentally undermined the rule by creating so 
many broad exceptions, many of which were applied in a 
haphazard fashion.
 
97  “Common law precepts, though well-meaning 
and unctuously spoken, die quickly when trapped in the withering 
crossfire of judicial exceptions.”98  Slough and Knightly particularly 
criticized the willingness of courts to admit propensity evidence in 
sex cases under the pretext of showing “design” and scheme.99  
Precedents justifying such pretexual admissions, they noted, spread 
to other types of cases.100  The authors concluded on a pessimistic 
note: “present rules, void of common meaning, will never halt the 
trend toward liberal admissibility.”101
In citing Slough and Knightly’s article, the drafters of Rule 404 
demonstrated that they recognized the problems with the common 
law character rule and its exceptions.  And yet they did nothing to 
address, much less fix, those problems.  The drafters codified what 
 
 
 93. FED. R. EVID. 404, advisory committee’s note. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. (citing M.C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 
41 IOWA L. REV. 325 (1956)). 
 97. Slough & Knightly, supra note 96 at 349–50. 
 98. Id. at 325. 
 99. Id. at 332–36. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 349. 
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they apparently knew was an incoherent mess.  In any event, 
because Rule 404 substantially codified the then-existing character 
evidence rule, it did little to change the law.  In Minnesota, when 
considering evidence of uncharged misconduct, courts continued 
to rely primarily on pre-Rules precedent such as Spreigl rather than 
on the Rule itself. 
II. THE PRESENT: CURRENT DOCTRINE AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
PROPENSITY EVIDENCE 
Minnesota’s current doctrine on the character evidence rule is 
a reflection of its past.  The doctrine has a confused history, and 
the confusion persists.  As the character evidence rule developed, 
Minnesota courts never articulated any coherent theory of when 
(and whether) a propensity inference is allowed.  Minnesota courts 
have yet to articulate such a theory.  That failing, moreover, is not 
merely academic or theoretical.  The concrete result is that 
propensity evidence is regularly allowed in the guise of 
404(b)/Spreigl evidence.   
To be sure, the cases are far from uniform.  The Spreigl issue is 
litigated as much as or more than any issue in Minnesota criminal 
law.102  With hundreds of appellate cases deciding Spreigl claims, it is 
not surprising that there are some cross-currents and 
contradictions, and it is impossible to describe the doctrine 
completely in a few pages.  Minnesota courts still occasionally 
vacillate between more restrictive and less restrictive standards, just 
as they did for the first century and a half of cases.103
 
 102. A LexisNexis search of Minnesota appellate cases in the last decade 
containing the term “Spreigl” yields 433 results.  A search for “Strickland” yields 
431; “Miranda” yields 365; “Apprendi” yields 263; and “Batson” yields 99.  See also 
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5239 (“There is no question of evidence more 
frequently litigated in the appellate courts than the admissibility of evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts.”). 
 103. See Chad M. Oldfather, Other Bad Acts and the Failure of Precedent, 28 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 151, 153 (2001) (discussing and criticizing the “internal tensions 
and inconsistencies” in Spreigl doctrine); Note, Evidence of Defendant’s Other Crimes: 
Admissibility in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REV. 608 (1953) (discussing and criticizing 
Minnesota’s approach to other acts evidence). 
  But despite 
the admitted lack of uniformity, it is still possible to draw some 
general conclusions about the Spreigl doctrine in Minnesota.  In 
general, Minnesota courts have adopted broad doctrines of 
admissibility that allow evidence of uncharged misconduct even 
when the primary or sole relevance of the evidence is based on 
20
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propensity. 
A. Some Foundational Issues 
There are several other purposes listed in Rule 404(b), and as 
a result, there are—or at least there should be—several distinct 
404(b) doctrines.  Before addressing specific difficulties with each 
doctrine, it is worth noting some general, foundational problems 
with the way in which Minnesota courts apply the character 
evidence rule.   
One foundational problem is that Minnesota courts 
occasionally fall into the habit of treating the various “other 
purposes” listed in Rule 404(b) as undifferentiated.  While it is true 
that the other purposes overlap in some respects, they are 
nonetheless analytically distinct.  The various listed purposes have 
distinct meanings and distinct applications.  When analyzing 
evidence of uncharged misconduct, it is not enough to simply say 
that it is relevant to show “motive, intent, plan, and identity.”  That 
sort of “laundry list” or “smorgasbord” approach has been 
criticized by both courts and scholars,104 and yet Minnesota courts 
occasionally employed it.105
A second problem is that Minnesota courts treat the 404(b) 




 104. See, e.g., SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 9, § 404.02[9] (criticizing the 
“laundry list” approach to Rule 404(b)). 
 105. See, e.g., Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Minn. 2004) (“The district court 
admitted the Edwards murder evidence for several purposes other than to identify 
Ture as the murderer of Wohlenhaus as well as Edwards, including to illustrate 
Ture’s intent and modus operandi.”); State v. Cote, No. A03-993, 2004 Minn. App. 
LEXIS 639, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 2004) (upholding the admission of 
evidence “under the motive and common-plan exceptions” without analyzing the 
difference between those two purposes); State v. Tennant, No. C3-89-2238, 1990 
Minn. App. LEXIS 777, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 1990) (“The state offered 
the prior assault conviction to show intent, identity, absence of mistake, and 
common scheme or plan.”). 
 106. See, e.g., State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 20 (Minn. 2008) (referring to the 
common plan “exception” to the character evidence rule); State v. Ness, 707 
N.W.2d 676, 688 (Minn. 2006) (discussing the same); State v. McLeod, 705 
N.W.2d 776, 785 (Minn. 2005) (discussing the same); Angus v. State, 695 N.W.2d 
109, 119 (Minn. 2005) (discussing the various Spreigl “exceptions to the general 
exclusionary rule”). 
  
Unlike the true exceptions to the character rule contained in Rules 
404(a)(1), (2), and (3), the listed purposes in 404(b) are not 
exceptions but rather non-character uses of other acts evidence.  
While this mistake may seem merely semantic, it is symptomatic of 
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a larger problem—a failure to understand what Rule 404(b) means 
and what it allows.107
That question is admittedly very difficult to answer in some 
cases.  In some cases, the distinction between propensity and non-
propensity reasoning will be difficult to decipher.  In such cases, 
reasonable jurists could disagree about whether some piece of 
evidence evades propensity reasoning or not.  But while the answer 
will not always be clear, questioning the precise means of relevance 
is critical to proper 404(b) analysis.  Minnesota courts occasionally 
ask that critical question,
 
Ultimately, the core flaw with the current Spreigl doctrine is 
that Minnesota courts often examine only whether uncharged 
misconduct is relevant to prove a 404(b) purpose, but they fail to 
examine how it is relevant.  Uncharged misconduct is almost always 
relevant to identity or intent, for example, because the propensity 
inference itself almost always provides relevance.  The important 
question is whether the uncharged misconduct is relevant in some 
way that does not rely on the propensity inference.  The important 
question, in other words, is whether there is some non-propensity 
chain of inferences that demonstrates motive, plan, intent, identity, 
and so on.   
108
A few examples show the depth of the problem.  In State v. 
Hill, the defendant was accused of having sex with his girlfriend’s 
young daughter.
 but generally they do not.  They do not 
appear to recognize that it makes any difference. 
109  The State presented evidence that, ten years 
earlier, he had sex with another girlfriend’s young daughter.110
 
 107. See FISHER, supra note 10, at 150 (“[T]hinking of the permitted purposes 
listed in Rule 404(b) as ‘exceptions’ to the propensity evidence ban can lead a 
court astray.”). 
 108. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 749 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he 
legitimacy of the purpose must be demonstrated, and the talismanic invocation of 
an item from the rule 404(b) list does not constitute such a demonstration.”); 
State v. Montgomery, 707 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (“It is not 
sufficient simply to recite a 404(b) purpose without also demonstrating at least an 
arguable legitimacy of that purpose.”). 
 109. State v. Hill, No. A06-371, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 273, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Mar. 27, 2007). 
 110. Id. at *3. 
  
The court of appeals upheld admission of the evidence to show 
“identity” on this basis: “[b]ecause Hill committed a similar crime 
in a similar way against similarly situated victims, it is more likely 
that Hill is the person who abused RBL [(the eight-year-old 
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daughter)].”111
In State v. Anderson,
  It said nothing more about the precise means of 
relevance. 
112 a defendant was charged with 
manufacturing meth.113  The State admitted evidence that a week 
after the arrest for the charged offense, Anderson was again 
arrested for attempting to manufacture meth.114  The court of 
appeals upheld the admission of the evidence on this basis: 
“Anderson’s subsequent arrest is sufficiently similar to make it 
relevant to the present offense, thus satisfying the [relevance 
requirement].”115
B. Unlinked Plans and the General Similarity Test 
  It said nothing more about the precise means of 
relevance. 
Hill and Anderson are extreme examples of a common 
tendency that runs through Minnesota Spreigl cases.  Courts note 
that evidence of some other act is relevant for some accepted 
404(b) purposes and thus admit the evidence without saying 
anything further.  The result is often a tacit endorsement of 
propensity reasoning and a broad doctrine of admissibility for 
evidence of uncharged misconduct. 
The single most important source of Minnesota’s very broad 
doctrine of admissibility is its adoption of the “unlinked plan” 
theory of the common plan doctrine.  One of the enumerated 
404(b) purposes is “plan.”116  Thus, under Rule 404(b), evidence of 
a defendant’s uncharged misconduct may be admitted to show his 
plan.  Most evidence law authorities state that to be admissible 
under the common plan doctrine, the uncharged acts should be 
somehow linked with the charged crime.117
 
 111. Id. at *5.   
 112. No. A03-1629, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 1065 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 
2004). 
 113. Id. *1. 
 114. Id. at *3–4.  
 115. Id. at *8–9. 
 116. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b); accord FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 
 117. See, e.g., 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 88, § 3.24 (criticizing the “unlinked 
plan” doctrine); 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 113, at 668 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the same); 2 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra, note 5, § 404.22[5][a] (discussing the same); Miguel A. Mendez & 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court’s About-Face on 
the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct, 28 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 473 (1995) (discussing the same); Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the 
Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 233–34 
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Under the “linked plan” theory, where uncharged and 
charged acts are both integral parts of some overarching criminal 
plan, uncharged acts are admissible.118  Thus, for example, “when a 
criminal steals a car to use it in a robbery, the automobile theft can 
be proved in a prosecution for the robbery.”119
Minnesota, however, does not require any direct linkage 
between charged and uncharged acts.  Rather, to admit evidence 
under Minnesota’s “common plan or scheme” doctrine, the 
prosecution need only show that the charged and uncharged acts 
are “similar in time, place, or modus operandi.”
  In such an 
example, because the uncharged act of theft is directly linked to 
the charged offense, the relevance of the uncharged act does not 
depend on a propensity inference.   
120  The test, in 
other words, is not one of linkage or interdependence; it is instead 
a test of similarity.  Minnesota’s doctrine is an example of what 
evidence scholars have called the “unlinked plan” or “spurious 
plan” theory of the common plan doctrine.121
1. Problems with the “Unlinked Plan” Doctrine 
 
There are several problems with Minnesota’s unlinked plan 
doctrine.  First, Minnesota courts have effectively merged the plan 
doctrine with the “modus operandi” doctrine.  Such a merger is 
unwise, because the “two theories proceed from very different 
premises, fundamentally affecting how each theory should 
operate.”122
Second, similarity is a vague and indeterminate metric for 
admissibility.  Minnesota courts have a long history of admitting 




(2005) (discussing the same); Susan Stuart, Evidentiary Use of Other Crime Evidence: A 
Survey of Recent Trends in Criminal Procedure, 20 IND. L. REV. 183, 197 (1987) 
(discussing the same); Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: 
Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437, 2470–71 (2000) (discussing the same). 
 118. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex Offense 
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 546–47 (1994). 
 119. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
 120. State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1998).   
 121. See, e.g., Bryden & Park, supra note 118, at 550. 
 122. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 13.5, at 720. 
  In State v. 
 123. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 721 N.W.2d 871, 877–78 (Minn. 2006) 
(upholding the admission of prior burglaries of elderly victims against a defendant 
charged with murder in the course of a burglary); State v. Wright, 719 N.W.2d 910, 
917–18 (Minn. 2006) (admitting a thirteen-year-old unlinked assault conviction to 
show a “common scheme” for a charged murder); State v. Berry, 484 N.W.2d 14, 
24
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Kennedy,124 the Minnesota Supreme Court said that, to be 
admissible, Spreigl evidence need only be “sufficiently or 
substantially similar to the charged offense.”125  More recently, in 
an apparent effort to tighten the requirements of admissibility (and 
in an arguable rejection of the Kennedy standard), the court 
emphasized in State v. Ness126 that uncharged and charged acts must 
bear “marked similarity.”127  Ness may have succeeded in tightening 
the standards somewhat,128 but Minnesota courts have nonetheless 
continued to rely on the Kennedy standard and admit evidence with 
low degrees of similarity.129
But, regardless of whether “marked” rather than “substantial” 
similarity is required, the more fundamental problem is that the 
notion of similarity itself is deeply relative.
   
130
 
17–18 (Minn. 1992) (admitting three prior instances of dissimilar violence 
because “[e]ach of the three incidents is relevant because of the similarity of the 
way appellant behaved when trying to maintain control of the people with whom 
he worked.”); State v. Krueth, No. A06-1590, 2008 Minn. App. LEXIS 486, at *5 
(Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2008) (upholding the admission of another murder in a 
murder case because “both victims were killed in darkness; both were killed with 
one shot; both were killed in their homes.”); State v. Bloodsaw, No. C7-01-365, 
2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 1407, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2001) (upholding 
the admission of a prior offense for promoting prostitution to show a current 
offense of promoting prostitution because both involved transporting prostitutes 
to a motel to meet with customers); State v. Schulberg, No. C4-95-2709, 1996 
Minn. App. LEXIS 1120, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1996) (upholding the 
admission of prior thefts and burglaries because “[e]ach was an offense against 
property”). 
 124.  585 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 2006). 
 125. Id. at 391. 
 126. 707 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 2006). 
 127. Id. at 688; see also State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 346–48 (Minn. 2007) 
(finding that the trial court had admitted insufficiently similar evidence but also 
finding the error harmless); State v. Black, No. A06-2390, 2008 Minn. LEXIS 379 
(Minn. July 15, 2008) (summarily reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision to 
uphold the admission of Spreigl evidence, and remanding for reconsideration in 
light of Ness’ “marked similarity” requirement). 
 128. See, e.g., State v. Black, No. A06-2390r, 2008 Minn. App. LEXIS 1226, at 
*8–17 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008); State v. Matlock, No. A06-1385, 2007 Minn. 
App. LEXIS 1019, at *7–9 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2007). 
 129. See, e.g., State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 20–22 (Minn. 2008) (upholding 
the admission of a prior burglary conviction to show “common plan” in a rape and 
murder case); State v. Carlson, No. A07-2144, 2009 Minn. App. LEXIS 175, at *8–
15 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2009) (relying on the Kennedy “substantially similar” 
standard and upholding the admission of evidence); State v. Petrin, No. A06-1913, 
2008 Minn. App. LEXIS 586, at *6–11 (Minn. Ct. App. May 20, 2008). 
  Indeed, in many 
 130. See Nelson Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in EXPERIENCE & THEORY 
19, 19 (L. Foster & J. Swanson eds. 1970) (“Similarity, ever ready to solve 
philosophical problems and overcome obstacles, is a pretender, an impostor, a 
25
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cases, there is no way to determine which factors cut which way.  If 
a man rapes one woman in Duluth and another in Minneapolis, are 
the two rapes geographically similar because they both took place 
in the same state, or are they geographically different because they 
took place 150 miles apart?  Asking that question is roughly 
equivalent to asking whether I am similar to a chimp.   
Third, and most fundamentally, Minnesota’s doctrine allows 
an inference that is indistinguishable from a propensity inference.  
The fact that an accused rapist has raped before in a roughly 
similar fashion does not show that he had a “plan” or “scheme” to 
commit both rapes—what it shows is that he commits the same type 
of offense repeatedly.  What it shows, in other words, is propensity.  
In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explicitly stated that 
such evidence is allowed to “complete the picture” of the 
defendant,131
The risks presented by such evidence are precisely the same 
risks that motivate the character rule, and the unlinked plan theory 
“effectively eviscerates the character ban whenever the individual 
has engaged in similar misconduct.”
 which seems like an invitation for character-based 
reasoning.   
132  Admitting similar acts “on 
the theory that they prove plan often smacks of a thin fiction that 
merely disguises what is in substance the forbidden propensity 
inference.”133
 
quack.”); Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal Comparisons, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 913, 941 
(1992) (“[S]imilarity is an especially elusive and troublesome concept.”). 
 131. State v. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d 75, 81 (Minn. 1999); State v. Berry, 484 
N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. 1992). 
 132. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 9.2.2, at 575. 
 133. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 117.  
 
A test based on similarity gets the rule backward.  As 
uncharged acts grow more similar to charged acts, they 
undoubtedly become more relevant, but they become more 
relevant largely because the propensity inference itself becomes 
stronger.  If Minnesota courts were to recognize that the propensity 
inference is itself off-limits (even when used to show a Spreigl 
purpose), then increased similarity would raise the prejudicial 
value more than the probative value.  But Minnesota courts do not 
recognize that point.  Instead, the current doctrine implicitly 
suggests that a stronger propensity inference based on similarity 
actually counts in favor of admission rather than against it. 
26
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2. Wermerskirchen, Wigmore, and Wright 
Minnesota courts have been largely impervious to the 
criticisms of the unlinked plan doctrine (as well as to those 
criticisms directed specifically at Minnesota case law on uncharged 
misconduct).134  The closest thing to a defense of the doctrine 
came in State v. Wermerskirchen,135 where the Minnesota Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the broad doctrine of admissibility in cases of sex 
crimes.136
It is undoubtedly true that some academic commentators 
would like the “common scheme or plan” doctrine to be 
one with a quite narrow application. These commentators 
also would like to limit other-crime evidence so that it may 
not be admitted to show the corpus delicti, to prove the 
doing of the act charged. Whatever the possible general 
merits of these arguments or their possible persuasiveness 
in some contexts, it is clear that in the specific context of 
rape and sex abuse prosecutions, particularly child sex 
abuse prosecutions, we have rejected the argument 
propounded by these academic commentators.
  In so doing, the court sniffed at critics: 
137
The court did not name or cite the “academic commentators” to 
which it was responding, and it is doubtful whether any such 
commentator has ever argued that other crimes are never 
admissible to prove the doing of the act charged—that was merely a 
straw man.  The court’s suggestion that sex crimes provide a 
particular reason for rejecting such criticisms was also strange 
because Minnesota has never limited the broad unlinked plan 
doctrine to sex crimes.
 
138
Somewhat more substantively, the court in Wermerskirchen went 
on to argue that its broad doctrine of admissibility was supported 




It is true that Wigmore argued that sexual assaults on other 
victims could, in at least some cases, be used as non-propensity 
  But its reliance on those authorities was, to put 
it mildly, dubious. 
 
 134. For earlier criticisms of Minnesota law, see Oldfather, supra note 103 and 
Note, supra note 103. 
 135. 497 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 1992). 
 136. Id. at 240. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
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evidence of plan or design.140  But even assuming that Wigmore was 
correct, he imposed several limitations on the plan doctrine that 
Minnesota has never followed.  First, Wigmore cautioned that the 
relevant “plan” must be some “plan to do the specific act charged” 
(rather than just a general “plan” to rape people), and without 
such a limitation, the evidence would violate the character rule.141  
Second, Wigmore emphasized that the test was a “stringent” one 
requiring a “much higher degree of similarity” similar to the 
traditional modus operandi doctrine.142  Third, Wigmore quoted 
with approval court cases holding that to be admissible as evidence 
of plan or design, uncharged acts must be somehow “connected” 
with the charged acts.143
Wigmore offered a telling example of the sort of case where a 
sexual assault on another woman could be admitted to show plan 
or design.  If a man were charged with assaulting a woman in her 
house, the prosecution could admit evidence “that the defendant 
on the same day, with a confederate guarding the house, assaulted 
other women in the same family who escaped, leaving the 




The court’s reading of Wright’s treatise was downright 
tendentious.  Professor Wright had indeed recognized that many 
courts had freely admitted other crimes evidence in sex cases.
  In such a case, where the two assaults were highly 
similar and truly connected, evidence of one could be offered to 
show the defendant’s plan or design, which would demonstrate 
that he had in fact committed the other. 
Minnesota has never limited its common plan doctrine to cases 
of the sort Wigmore had in mind.  In fact, Minnesota has adopted 
precisely the sort of general similarity test that Wigmore expressly 
rejected.  The Wermerskirchen court’s reliance on Wigmore as 
apparent support for its broad doctrine was misplaced. 
145  
He suggested that courts did so because they were “understandably 
desperate for some evidence beyond the victim’s accusation that 
will prove that the accused did the acts of which he stands 
charged.”146
 
 140. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 357. 
 141. Id. § 304, at 249 n.1. 
 142. Id. § 304, at 251. 
 143. Id. § 304, at 252. 
 144. Id. § 304, at 249. 
 145. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5239, at 461–62. 
 146. Id.   
  The thrust of Wright’s argument was that, due to the 
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powerful moral and political forces at play in rape cases, courts had 
(essentially for policy reasons) stretched the doctrine to admit 
other crimes evidence.147
But while the nature of rape cases makes such decisions 
“understandable,” Wright never suggested that such decisions were 
legally justified under the character evidence rule.
   
148  In fact, he 
went on to say that courts had relied on “debatable assumptions 
about recidivism and problematic psychiatric theories.”149  He 
argued that courts had admitted such evidence “under the guise” 
of Rule 404(b), when in fact the evidence was only relevant to show 
“the propensity inference that the general rule in 404(b) is 
supposed to exclude.”150
C. From Unlinked Plans to Other “Exceptions” 
  In short, by selectively quoting Wright’s 
treatise, the Wermerskirchen court implied that Wright had endorsed 
the very cases he criticized.   
If the character evidence rule bars propensity inferences, the 
unlinked plan doctrine cannot be justified.  Minnesota courts, 
however, have long allowed an expansive form of the doctrine, and 
they have never responded to, or even recognized, the mass of 
evidence law authority criticizing the doctrine.  By accepting 
evidence of uncharged acts based merely on similarity, Minnesota 
courts have implicitly accepted propensity reasoning. 
The common plan or scheme doctrine dominates Spreigl cases 
in Minnesota.  The doctrine is so expansive that it often obviates 
the need to examine the other listed 404(b) purposes.  In some 
cases, moreover, Minnesota courts seem to treat the general 
similarity test for the scheme doctrine as being the overriding test 
for all 404(b) purposes.151
 
 147. See id. § 5239, at 462. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at n.5. 
  But even to the extent that separate 
 151. See State v. Perez, 397 N.W.2d 916, 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 
(“Regardless of the purpose for which the evidence is admitted, there must be 
some relationship in time, location, or modus operandi between the crime 
charged and the [prior crime] . . . .”); see also State v. Tabaka, No. A05-1899, 2007 
Minn. App. LEXIS 337, at *18 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007) (stating that for 
evidence offered to show knowledge, relevance and materiality depend on 
similarity); Bendzula v. State, No. A05-137, 2005 Minn. App. LEXIS 305, at *9–10 
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2005) (relying on common plan standard and holding 
that prior similar drug offenses were relevant to show “access to drugs”); State v. 
Jones, No. A03-1136, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 951 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004) 
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doctrines for other purposes are developed, they exhibit their own 
similar problems.  The problems all stem from courts’ failure to 
examine and explain exactly how a particular piece of uncharged 
misconduct evidence demonstrates a particular 404(b) purpose. 
1. Intent and Absence of Mistake or Accident 
Some form of intent is an element of most crimes.  A 
defendant can negate intent by showing that his conduct was the 
result of an accident or mistake.152  Rule 404(b) states that evidence 
of other acts can be used to show “intent” and also “absence of 
mistake or accident.”153 The two categories, though listed 
separately, are almost coextensive.  They are properly treated 
together because “‘[a]bsence of mistake or accident’ is generally 
synonymous with intent.”154
Minnesota courts, however, have not always recognized that 
“intent” and “absence of mistake or accident” are essentially 
synonymous under the rule.  In State v. Clark,
   
155 for example, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court treated the two categories as entirely 
separate.  The defendant and his accomplice Reed were charged 
with killing a police officer.156  The state admitted evidence that 
Clark and Reed had also robbed a bank.157  The court held that the 
evidence was not admissible to show intent, but it nonetheless held 
that the evidence was admissible to show “absence of mistake.”158
At other times, Minnesota courts have allowed the admission 
to show “absence of accident” even when no issue of intent was 
raised.  In State v. Nelson,
  It 
offered no explanation for the distinction.  
159
 
(stating that for evidence offered to show motive, “[r]elevance and materiality 
depend on” similarity); State v. Cote, No. A03-993, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 639, at 
*9 (Minn. Ct. App. June 8, 2004) (applying similarity test for evidence admitted 
“under the motive and common-plan exceptions”).  But see MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, § 4:30 (“One might think that the important thing is a 
close resemblance between the prior and the charged offense. Often resemblance 
does indeed count, but not always.”). 
 152. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 10, at 148. 
 153. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 154. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 7.2.2, at 429. 
 155. 755 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 2008). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 245. 
 158. Id. at 261. 
 159. 562 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) 
 the defendant was charged with 
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assaulting her daughter.160  The defendant claimed that her 
daughter’s injuries were caused while playing with her sister—she 
denied, in other words, that she had committed the charged 
conduct at all.161  The court of appeals upheld the admission of 
evidence of a prior instance of abuse on the theory that it showed 
“absence of accident” and thus rebutted the defense.162  But the 
defense, although it involved a claimed accident, had nothing to do 
with intent.163
Finally, even where Minnesota courts do recognize the 
congruence between intent and absence of mistake, they often fail 
to recognize that intent is an ultimate fact that is usually the “last 
inference in a logical chain of reasoning that leads through other 
facts” such as knowledge, motive, or plan.
  If the evidence had any relevance aside from 
propensity, the court failed to identify it. 
164  To the extent that 
intent can be proved more directly by evidence of other acts, it is 
typically through the “doctrine of chances.”165  Minnesota courts 
have almost never discussed the doctrine of chances,166 and yet they 
have admitted evidence of uncharged acts to show intent without 
explaining how the evidence demonstrates intent, and without 
explaining whether the chain of reasoning actually avoids the 
propensity inference.167
 
 160. Id. at 325. 
 161. Id. at 326. 
 162. Id. at 327. 
 163. Nor was the prior incident otherwise relevant through the doctrine of 
chances.  Id.  
 164. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 7.1, at 426. 
 165. Id. § 7.3.2. 
 166. The only discussion of the doctrine by a Minnesota appellate court came 
in a recent unpublished case.  State v. Owens, No. A06-2481, 2008 Minn. App. 
LEXIS 495, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2008) (“The doctrine of chances has not 
been adopted by Minnesota appellate courts, but the principles underlying the 
doctrine are similar to those underlying Minnesota’s other-bad-acts rule.”).  
 167. State v. Babcock, No. C9-03-131, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1465 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Dec. 9, 2003) (upholding the admission of prior instances of violence to 
show absence of mistake in a murder case); State v. Belssner, 463 N.W.2d 903, 
909–10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a defendant’s previous convictions for 
forgeries were relevant to show his intent in the charged forgery because the 
previous instances were similar); State v. Stevens, No. C7-88-935, 1989 Minn. App. 
LEXIS 343 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1989) (upholding the admission of other 
frauds, without further analysis, because they “were plainly relevant to show intent 
and absence of mistake”). 
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2. Knowledge 
Knowledge is an element of some criminal offenses.  For 
example, to prove a drug possession offense, the prosecution must 
prove that the defendant knew the nature of the substance.168  
Other acts can demonstrate knowledge.169  If a defendant claims 
that he thought the cocaine found in his possession was baby 
powder, the prosecution can admit evidence of other instances of 
knowing cocaine possession to prove the element of knowledge in 
the charged crime.170
But the probative value of such evidence depends in large part 
on the nature of the defense.  In drug cases where the dispute 
centers on some other element, the use of prior convictions to 
show knowledge is much more dubious.
   
171  Minnesota courts 
nonetheless regularly admit such evidence regardless of the nature 
of the defense.  In State v. Tabaka,172 for example, the court of 
appeals upheld the admission of the defendant’s prior meth 
convictions to show “that he knew what methamphetamine is,” 
even though there was no suggestion that Tabaka had presented 
any lack of knowledge defense.173
Similarly, in State v. Datwyler,
 
174 a defendant was charged with 
conspiracy to manufacture meth.175  The defendant had essentially 
conceded that she was planning to manufacture meth—she had 
conceded, in other words, attempted manufacture, but she contested 
conspiracy, which carries a greater punishment.176
 
 168. United States v. Eggleston, 165 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 169. Such evidence is important especially where the defendant’s knowledge is 
disputed.  Minnesota courts admit Spreigl evidence to show knowledge regardless 
of whether knowledge is disputed.  See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). 
 170. See Eggleston, 165 F.3d at 624.  Similarly, where a defendant presents a 
“mere presence” defense, the prosecution can admit evidence of other instances 
of the defendant encountering the illegal substance.  See, e.g., State v. Schostag, 
No. C9-95-2236, 1996 WL 422511, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 30, 1996).     
 171. See Eggleston, 165 F.3d at 624; NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 6.3.1, at 391. 
 172. No. A05-1899, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 337 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 
2007) 
 173. Id. at *18.  See, e.g., State v. Penny, No. C3-03-142, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 
314, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2004); State v. Schostag, No. C9-95-2236, 1996 
Minn. App. LEXIS 884, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 30, 1996.). 
 174. No. A04-2255, 2006 Minn. App. LEXIS 93, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 
2006). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at *8. 
  The State was 
allowed to present evidence of her prior conviction for 
manufacturing meth on the theory that it demonstrated her 
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“knowledge of the manufacturing process.”177  Her knowledge was 
not disputed, and in any event, it had no tendency to prove the 
agreement necessary to support the conspiracy charge.178  The 
court of appeals nonetheless upheld the admission of the Spreigl 
evidence to show her knowledge.179
In cases like Tabaka and Datwyler, “the uncharged misconduct 
evidence is relevant on both character and non-character bases.”
   
180  
The relative strength of each inference depends on the case—it 
depends largely on the nature of the defense presented.  In cases 
like Tabaka and Datwyler, where knowledge is not contested,181 the 
probative value of the non-character inference is minimal, and thus 
the possibility that the jury will use the evidence primarily to 
support a character inference is much greater.  The cases are 
certainly not uniform,182
3. Identity 
 but Minnesota courts too often admit such 
evidence. 
Identity is always an element of a crime—the prosecution must 
always prove that the defendant—not someone else—committed 
the conduct constituting the offense.183  Like intent, identity is one 
of the listed 404(b) purposes, but like intent, it is rarely a distinct 
ground for admission.  Identity is almost always proven by means of 
one of the other purposes, such as motive, opportunity, or plan.184
 
 177. Id. at *4. 
 178. Id. at *6.   
 179. Id. at *6–8.   
 180. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 6.3.1, at 382. 
 181. Even where knowledge of some sort is denied, the relevance of the 
evidence depends on the nature of the denial.  In State v. Anderson, No. A04-1888, 
2005 Minn. App. LEXIS 571 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005), for example, a 
defendant charged with meth possession testified that he was not aware that there 
was a baggie of meth under his car seat.  The court upheld the admission of his 
prior meth offense to show knowledge.  Id. at *14–15.  But while the prior 
conviction clearly demonstrated knowledge of the nature of the substance, it is 
difficult to see how it demonstrated any knowledge that there was a meth baggie 
under his seat on that occasion—again, the primary relevance is propensity. 
 182. See State v. Jones, No. A06-35, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 525 (Minn. Ct. 
App. June 5, 2007) (reversing conviction where prior gun crimes were admitted to 
show that the defendant knew there was a gun in the car); State v. Montgomery, 
707 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing drug conviction where the state 
admitted prior drug convictions as Spreigl evidence). 
 183. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 571 (2008) (“Identification of the defendant 
as the guilty actor is essential, so that any evidence which serves to establish the 
actor’s identity is relevant, and, if competent, is admissible.”).   
   
 184. At times, Minnesota courts have suggested that Spreigl evidence may 
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Minnesota courts unfortunately fall into the trap of “us[ing] 
the ‘identity’ label to justify admission of uncharged misconduct 
evidence without analyzing the logic that supports that 
conclusion.”185  In State v. Clark,186 for example, the supreme court 
stated that another robbery with an accomplice was admissible to 
show identity as common actors, but it made no effort to explain 
how it showed identity without relying on propensity.187
In State v. Smith,
   
188 a defendant was charged with being a felon 
in possession of a firearm, but he denied that the gun discovered by 
police belonged to him.189  The court of appeals held that two prior 
felon-in-possession convictions were relevant to show identity.190
The other-acts evidence, showing conclusively that at one 
time he admitted to possessing a gun when he was 
ineligible to do so and showing convincingly that he was 
in the presence of guns at the same location and at a time 
not remote from the date of the search, surely made it 
more likely that he possessed the gun at issue than if there 
was no such other-acts evidence. The evidence was 
relevant for the purpose of showing the identity of Smith 
as the possessor of a firearm.
   
191
While it is true that the prior convictions for possessing other 
weapons “surely made it more likely” that Smith possessed the 
weapon in the charged incident, the important question is how they 
make it more likely.
 
192
Ironically, the opinion in Smith contained one of the most 
sophisticated discussions of the character rule ever found in 
Minnesota law.  It came closer than any other Minnesota case in 
history to endorsing the traditional view of Rule 404(b).  And yet in 
the end, the Smith court endorsed an apparent a chain of 
inferences—from prior possession of a different gun to “identity” 
in the charged incident—that has little or no probative force apart 
  It is difficult to see how they do so other 
than by propensity reasoning.   
 
demonstrate identity only by way of the common plan doctrine.  See State v. 
Matlock, No. A06-1385, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 1019, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 
2, 2007). 
 185. NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 12.3, at 694. 
 186. 755 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 2008). 
 187. Id. 
 188. 749 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 189. Id. at 90–91. 
 190. Id. at 94. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.  
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from propensity. 
4. Summary 
These cases analyzing identity, knowledge, and intent are just a 
small sample of the hundreds of Minnesota appellate cases 
involving Spreigl evidence.  This sample is not perfectly 
representative of the massive body of Spreigl law—no sample could 
be, since conflicting threads abound within the case law.  But this 
sample nonetheless demonstrates the critical feature of 
Minnesota’s Spreigl doctrine, which is a failure to follow—or even 
recognize—the traditional view of Rule 404(b).   
Under the traditional view, when evidence is offered for a 
404(b) other purpose, the critical question is not whether the 
evidence is relevant, but how the evidence is relevant.  Under the 
traditional view, courts must ask whether the evidence of 
uncharged misconduct is relevant through some means other than 
propensity.  Minnesota courts do not ask that question.  Because 
the core principle of the traditional view is absent in Minnesota, 
the Spreigl doctrine is largely unmoored.  Uncharged misconduct 
evidence is often admitted but occasionally excluded, and other 
than the general similarity test taken from the common plan 
doctrine, it is difficult to find any guiding principle that runs 
through the cases.   
D. More Procedural Protections 
But even as current Minnesota law freely admits 404(b) 
evidence, however, it provides unusual procedural protections.  
Since Spreigl, the Minnesota Supreme Court has identified “[a] 
number of procedural requirements and safeguards [to] govern 
the admission, presentation, and consideration of other-crime 
evidence.”193  These safeguards were ultimately translated into a 
five-part test adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court.194  In 2006, 
the same five-part test was written into Rule 404(b) itself.195
In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not be 
admitted unless 1) the prosecutor gives notice of its intent 
to admit the evidence consistent with the rules of criminal 
  The 
amended rule now states: 
 
 193. State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 196 (Minn. 1995). 
 194. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. 2006). 
 195. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b). 
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procedure; 2) the prosecutor clearly indicates what the 
evidence will be offered to prove; 3) the other crime, 
wrong, or act and the participation in it by a relevant 
person are proven by clear and convincing evidence; 4) 
the evidence is relevant to the prosecutor’s case; and 5) 
the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by 
its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.196
The fourth requirement probably does nothing other than 
restate the general relevance requirement of Rules 401 and 402 
that applies to all evidence.
 
The first requirement—that of pre-trial notice—is drawn from 
Spreigl itself.   
197  The second requirement is also 
possibly superfluous—a party offering evidence has a general 
obligation to indicate its relevance (at least if the admission is 
contested).198
The third requirement—the clear and convincing standard—is 
more concrete.  It marks a departure from federal law, under 
which questions regarding the existence and participation of the 
other act are governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) and the 
standard developed in Huddleston v. United States.
  But arguably the “clearly indicates” language 
imposes some heightened level of precision on the prosecution.   
199  The Huddleston 
standard merely requires evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the previous act occurred.200
The fifth requirement also marks a departure from federal law.  
Under federal law, the balancing test for 404(b) evidence is drawn 
from Rule 403.  Rule 403 allows exclusion only if the potential for 
unfair prejudice “substantially outweigh[s]” the probative value of 
  Minnesota’s clear and convincing 
standard is much more stringent.  Of course, in cases where the 
other act resulted in a conviction, and has thus already been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard makes no 
difference. 
 
 196. Id.; see also id. advisory committee cmt. (2006). 
 197. See MINN. R. EVID. 401, 402. 
 198. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (stating that in order to preserve a claim of error 
for excluding evidence, a party must make “the substance of the evidence . . . 
known to the court”); MINN. R. EVID. 103(a) (restating the corresponding federal 
rule); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, § 1.5, at 17 (“[A]n offer of proof 
should indicate the nature or content of the evidence and describe its purpose 
and why it is relevant (at least if there is room for doubt).”). 
 199. 485 U.S. 681 (1988); see also NEW WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 4.8, at 294 
(discussing state law departures from Huddleston). 
 200. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685. 
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the evidence.201  By contrast, Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
employs a specialized and more restrictive version of the balancing 
test: one that eliminates the modifier “substantially.”202  The 
Minnesota Advisory Committee intentionally adopted this “more 
stringent test” to make clear that a “slight balance in favor of unfair 
prejudice requires exclusion.”203
In the Spreigl decision itself, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
recognized substantial problems with the character evidence rule, 
but rather than addressing the substantive issues, it sought a 
procedural solution.
 
The more restrictive balancing test is meant to favor criminal 
defendants.  But the test can function properly only if courts are 
clear about what is weighed on each side of the scale—about what 
counts as legitimate probative value, and what counts as unfair 
prejudice.  If the underlying substantive issues are not handled with 
care, then the balancing test breaks down, and removing the word 
“substantially” does nothing to fix the problem.  Minnesota courts 
do not carefully analyze the various competing inferences at stake.  
As a result, they approve propensity inferences under the guise of 
Spreigl evidence, and the propensity inference ends up weighed on 
the wrong side of the scale. 
204
III. THE FUTURE: A CANDID POLICY DEBATE 
  The court and the Advisory Committee 
have continued to pursue the same strategy ever since.  They have 
provided heightened procedural protections, but they have left the 
substantive doctrines of admissibility untouched.  The result is that 
evidence of uncharged misconduct is broadly admissible in 
Minnesota criminal cases despite the procedural safeguards.  The 
procedural safeguards are certainly well-intentioned, and perhaps 
they are sensible on the merits, but they do nothing to address the 
legal fictions that dominate the Spreigl doctrine.  The focus on 
procedure may even be affirmatively harmful in that it distracts 
courts from the more important substantive issues. 
The current Spreigl doctrine in Minnesota is not very sensible.  
Courts admit evidence to prove 404(b) purposes, but because they 
do not carefully examine the routes of relevance, they allow 
 
 201. FED. R. EVID. 403; MINN. R. EVID. 403. 
 202. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 203. See id. advisory committee cmt. (2006). 
 204. State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 493–97, 139 N.W.2d 167, 171–73 (1965). 
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propensity inferences in many such cases.  In one sense, that 
confusion is an understandable result of the history of the 
character evidence rule, which at least in Minnesota, does not 
reveal a clear stance on the propensity inference.  But while history 
provides some explanation, it does not provide any justification for 
continued failings.  In light of the character rule’s modern 
rationale, and in light of the nearly uniform teaching of evidence 
law authorities, Minnesota’s doctrine makes little sense. 
It could be, however, that the decisions of Minnesota courts 
are not a reflection of any confusion regarding the rule, but are 
instead a reflection of a policy disagreement regarding the rule.  
Despite the lofty aspirations that underlie the character evidence 
rule, it is not universally admired.  Legislatures around the country 
have chipped away at the rule, creating explicit exceptions for sex 
crimes and certain other offenses.205  Many other legal systems 
operate without any character evidence ban,206 and some scholars 
have called for its repeal.207
The rule should not be maintained for tradition’s sake.  The 
tradition is both less old and less sensible than many believe.  The 
rule should not be maintained simply to draw a line of separation 
  Their arguments are not without force.  
Courts’ willingness to allow disguised propensity evidence might 
reflect their tacit agreement with the rule’s critics. 
Before deciding whether and how to fix Minnesota’s Spreigl 
doctrine, then, it is necessary to decide whether to have a character 
evidence rule at all.  The policy question is primary.  It is time for 
that question to be presented and debated openly.   
 
 205. See FED. R. EVID. 413–15; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1108–09; see also FISHER, supra 
note 10, at 208 (listing eight jurisdictions that have created explicit exceptions to 
the character evidence rule for sex crimes). 
 206. See generally Mirjan R. Damaska, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal 
Systems, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (1994); see also Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary 
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 464 (1992). 
 207. David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and 
Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 35 (1994); Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character 
Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1547, 1620–26 (1998); H. Richard Uviller, 
Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 890 (1982) (arguing that “character evidence cannot and 
should not be banished from the field of proof”).  The Justice Department has 
also campaigned against the rule.  See Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney 
General on the Admission of Criminal Histories at Trial, ‘Truth in Criminal Justice’ Report 
No. 4, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 708 (1989); William P. Barr, Attorney General, U.S. 
Dept. Justice, Recommendations for State Criminal Justice Systems, 51 CRIM. L. REP. 
2315, 2326 (1992) (Recommendation 13). 
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between Anglo-American and Continental systems of justice.208  
Continental legal systems might be correct in their approach to this 
particular problem, and in any event, it can no longer be seriously 
maintained that our criminal justice system is more protective of 
criminal defendants than European systems.209
The framework of the cost-benefit analysis is straightforward.  
The benefit of abolishing the rule would be a reduction in false 
negatives; the cost would be an increase in false positives.
   
The rule should be maintained only if it promotes accuracy in 
criminal adjudications.  If the system would reach accurate 
resolutions of guilt or innocence more often without the character 
evidence rule, then it should be scrapped.  Abolishing the rule 
would presumably lead to more convictions—convictions in cases 
that would produce acquittals without propensity evidence.  Some 
of those convictions would be inaccurate, but some would be 
accurate.  
210
Those judgments are not easily made.  Empirical data about 
the former judgment will be difficult or impossible to come by.
  The 
ultimate cost-benefit analysis rests on two underlying judgments: 
(1) an empirical judgment about what ratio of reduced false 
negatives to increased false positives the rule’s abolition would 
produce, and (2) a normative judgment about what ratio would 
make such a change worthwhile. 
211  It 
may be, therefore, that the outcome of the debate will ultimately 
depend on the latter moral-normative point.212
 
 208. See WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 194, at 233 (stating that the character rule 
“represents a revolution in the theory of criminal trials, and is one of the peculiar 
features, of vast moment, which distinguishes the Anglo-American from the 
Continental system of evidence”); Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 432 (“The rule 
distinguishes our criminal justice system from both Continental and totalitarian 
legal systems.”). 
 209. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
 210. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
 211. Testing the accuracy-producing benefits of various rules is extremely 
difficult in part because designing and running effective jury simulations is 
difficult.  See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the 
Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999); Shari Seidman Diamond, 
Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997). 
 212. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 
(1999) (arguing that though policy debates are often framed in empirical terms, 
underlying normative and moral judgments tend to drive the debates). 
  Blackstone said “it 
is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent 
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suffer,”213 but reasonable people can disagree about whether ten-to-
one is the right ratio.214  Reasonable people can likewise disagree 
about whether it makes sense to maintain the character evidence 
rule.  But it is a debate worth having.  And it is a debate worth 
having candidly,215 in an open fashion, rather than in the hidden 
and somewhat duplicitous common law fashion where courts 
fashion a rule and then habitually ignore it.216
It is a debate best suited for the legislature.  The judiciary has 
no special institutional competence that makes it best suited for the 
empirical and moral judgments that drive the cost-benefit analysis 
described above.
   
217  The debate will depend on balancing a variety 
of competing considerations, and it will depend heavily on 
assessments of societal values—it is precisely the sort of debate 
better handled by legislatures than courts.218  Balancing all of the 
competing considerations, the legislature could decide to repeal 
Rule 404.  It could decide to maintain it.  Or it could seek a 
compromise solution, such as repealing the rule for sex crimes 
cases but maintaining it for others, as the Federal Rules currently 
do.219
 
 213. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. 
 214. Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). 
 215. Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 296–97 (1990); Paul 
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 666–68 (1983); David L. Shapiro, 
In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736–38 (1987). 
 216. See John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 
1223 (2006) (noting that “the law clings to the rules purporting to exclude other 
crimes and character evidence, despite their almost total negation in practice . . . 
.”). 
 217. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to 
Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994) (outlining a theory of comparative 
institutional competence). 
 218. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 981 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (“[I]f such a decision requires the resolution of so 
many difficult policy questions, many of them beyond the normal compass of a 
single case or controversy such as those with which the courts regularly deal, 
doesn’t that decision smack of legislation more than adjudication?”); In re Grand 
Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1154–55 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Congress is able to consider, for 
example, society’s moral, sociological, economic, religious and other values 
without being confined to the evidentiary record in any particular case.”). 
  As a policy matter, each possible outcome is arguably 
 219. See FED. R. EVID. 413 (admitting evidence of prior sex crimes against 
defendants charged with sex crimes); see also Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” Versus 
“What Was Done”: When to Admit Character Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
939 (2001) (arguing “that different categories of criminal cases . . . call for distinct 
rules regarding propensity evidence”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the 
Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting 
the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 301–02 (1995) 
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justifiable.   
The current case law, in its substantially incoherent form, 
would benefit from legislative guidance.  Of course, courts might 
bristle at legislative intervention.  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
has stated in the past that the creation of rules of evidence is a 
quintessentially judicial function, and that the court retains 
inherent authority to ignore or strike down legislative 
intervention.220  Such claims of judicial supremacy over evidence 
law are somewhat dubious even in the abstract.221
As it is currently enforced by Minnesota courts, the character 
evidence rule is not worth having.  If the propensity inference is 
allowed to prove all “other purposes” such as intent and identity, 
then Rule 404 serves no purpose.  Either the fictions of the current 
doctrine should be abandoned, or the pretense of the rule itself 
should be abandoned.
  But especially in 
this instance, where the Minnesota Supreme Court has so often 
issued decisions weakening the rule, it could hardly complain if the 
legislature delivered a final blow of outright repeal. 
222
 
(arguing for experimental partial repeals of the character evidence rule). 
 220. State v. Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d 409, 416 n.10 (Minn. 2002) (“While we 
acknowledge that the legislature has taken steps to limit the power of the court 
with respect to certain evidentiary issues,  . . . it is clear that the judicial branch has 
ultimate and final authority in such matters.”); see also State v. Johnson, 514 
N.W.2d 551, 553–54 (Minn. 1994); State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 46 n.3 (Minn. 
1990). 
 221. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e 
must recognize that Congress has the ultimate power over the enactment of rules 
[of evidence] . . . .”); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court 
Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888–89 
(1999); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015, 1022 (1982); see also Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] 
Rulemaking”, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (2002) (discussing various views of comparative 
institutional competence for the creation of evidence law). 
Rosanna Cavallaro has recently argued (responding to Congress’s enactment of 
Federal Rules 413–15) that questions regarding the admission of character 
evidence are generally best handled by the judiciary rather than the legislature.  
Rosanna Cavallaro, Criminal Law: Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Struggle for 
Rulemaking Preeminence, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31 (2007).  Even Professor 
Cavallaro concedes, however, (contrary to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s view) 
that the “debate is best understood not as one of constitutional power but of 
prudence.”  Id. at 39 n.27.   
 222. See Reed, supra note 117, at 250–51 (“It is time to admit that in the real 
world of the criminal prosecutions, the  prosecutor will be able to prove relevant 
specific instances of the accused’s uncharged misconduct by employing the ‘magic 
words’ vocabulary of Rule 404(b) . . . .”). 
  Which course is best is debatable, but it is 
a debate worth having, and worth having candidly.   
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Then again, perhaps candor is overrated.223
 
 223. See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
1307 (1995). 
  Potemkin villages 
have a purpose, after all—they are meant to reassure.  The Spreigl 
doctrine may lack logic and rigor, but it may be functionally useful 
precisely because it shrouds and buries the difficult policy debate 
about the character evidence rule.  With Spreigl in place, we can 
pretend to maintain the lofty ideals of the character evidence rule 
while still convicting and caging the men whose malign 
propensities make their guilt  (or at least their dangerousness) 
more obvious.  The legal fictions of current law allow us to avoid 
hard choices, and for that reason, they are unlikely to disappear. 
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